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Since 1972 Labor federal governments have implemented a policy
of economic liberalisation in Australian agriculture. It was in this
area that the Whitlam government showed itself most sympathetic
to market liberalism. Australian agricultural economists were the
first Australian economists to champion economic liberalisation and
they welcomed Whitlam's initiatives. I To economic liberals all forms
of agricultural product market regulation constitute unproductive rent
seeking. As a result agricultural economists have shown little interest
in examining the ideologies and forms of Labor agricultural
regulation. 2 Labour historians and activists have followed a similar
pattern. They have taken for granted Labor's support of agricultural
regulation, and the party's pursuit of farmers ' votes, and have argued
over its significance. To the right it demonstrates Labor's status as a
peoples' party, to the left it shows how Labor in government from an
early stage privileged petty-bourgeoisie interests. 3
Agricultural policy was contested within the pre-Whitlam
Australian Labor Party (ALP). I will demonstrate this fact by an
examination of the agricultural policy of the NSW Labor government
of 1930-32, with particular reference to wheat and dairy farming. In
1930 NSW Labor campaigned heavily on agricultural issues and
won a level of rural electoral support comparable to that of William
McKell in 1941, an achievement neglected by McKell's admirers"
In eighteen months of power Jack Lang's government devoted as
much attention to agricultural policy as did McKell's government,
which the NSW ALP right takes as the model of Labor agrarianism. s
Despite this attention at the May 1932 election NSW Labor lost every
rural electorate. This debacle revealed the limits of labour
agrarianism.

1. The two labor agrarian isms
The competing traditions of Labor agrarianism shared an assumption
I call 'corporatist.' Both traditions identified farmers as a group that
shared common interests, but they diverged on how these interests
should be identified and represented. The two competing traditions
I identifY as pluralist and statist.
Both traditions believed that in the free market 'middlemen' to
the cost of both parties corrupted the simple exchange between
producers and consumers. Both believed that a Labor government
could establish institutions that would cut out the middleman. Both
believed that the promise of such institutions would win farmers'
support back from the Country Party, which (particularly in NSW)
was constrained by its alliance with the Nationalists from fully
supporting regulation of agricultural marketing. 6
Statist corporatism was popular among rural party activists. It
was expressed by Labor policy that called for co-operation 'between
the primary producer and the producer in the industrial sphere.' It
identified farmers as workers and believed that their distrust of
organised labour revealed a false consciousness on their part. Farmers
who voted Labor, and particularly those who joined the ALP,
supported the ALP because they identified themselves as workers
(and often also Catholics) rather than because they saw the
ALP as best suited to represent farmers. It is a similar process

to the tendency of white-collar Labor identifiers to identify
themselves as working-c1ass. 7 Country Labor supporters were more
conservative than urban Labor identifiers, as shown by the collapse
of Lang's rural support in 1932 and the greater support for Scullin
against Lang. Their reaction against Lang in 1931-32 was not driven
by a belief that he neglected agriculture but opposition to his
perceived radicalism. Statist corporatists believed that the interests
of farmers were best represented by a Labor government. They
supported government controlled marketing organisations that
removed middlemen, and replaced the existing farmers' organisations
that misled their members.8
The pluralist corporatist tradition shared a distrust of market
forces and middlemen but it identified the interests of farmers and
workers as potentially in conflict. Pluralist corporatists knew that
although farmers might resent produce merchants they distrusted
state controlled marketing organisations as inefficient and
unresponsive. 9 It sought to work with farmers' organisations, such
as the wheatfarmer dominated NSW Farmers and Settlers Association
(FSA). Pluralist corporatists feared that excessive union demands
could alienate farmers, and believed that electoral success required
that urban unionists not be granted unrestrained control of party
policy. It was Labor parliamentarians, particularly those from rural
electorates, who were most likely to support pluralist corporatism.
They were likely to accept farmers' preference for producer controlled
marketing organisations. Organised marketing would also obscure
the transfer of income by means of higher produce prices from urban
working-class consumers (in safe Labor seats) to farmers in marginal
electorates. 10 Country branch members and unionists were less likely
to support this policy than Labor parliamentarians. In 1941 McKell
overruled country branches and centrally endorsed rural candidates
precisely because he believed that country branches were
unrepresentative of their electorates. II A similar pattern of
parliamentarians driving Labor government agricultural policy was
apparent in Queensland. This state is often presented as the bailiwick
of Labor agrarianism, but party conferences were dominated by the
industrial concerns of the Australian Workers' Union and agricultural
policy was developed by ministers rather than the party.12
In 1926-27 Lang's first government found its narrow majority
threatened by dissident country Labor parliamentarians. To appease
them it followed a policy of pluralist corporatism. In September 1926
it convened a conference of 'producers and consumers' at Bathurst.
The producers were elected from local meetings of farmers. The
consumers' representatives were largely selected by trade unions.
Producers outnumbered consumers. Working groups at the
conference generally supported collective marketing with majority
producer contro1. 13 In 1927 Labor legislation allowed farmers by a
two-thirds majority to establish a compUlsory pool that would
purchase all the produce of the sector from farmers and sell it to the
pUblic. Each pool would have a five-member board, of whom three,
including the president, were producers' representatives. 14 Of nine
ballots (two for wheat) only one failed to reach 50%, but
ballots of butter, millet and wheat producers failed to return a

two-thirds majority. Boards were established only for rice, eggs and
honey. 15
Worldwide export prices for prices of most agricultural
commodities declined from the mid 1920s. This decline contributed
to and was then accelerated by the onset of the world economic slump
from 1929. 16 This slump had a distinctive impact on the Australian
political economy. The Australian economy had oligopolistic and
competitive sectors. In the competitive sector farmers were pricetakers (along with women engaged in household labour) whose
labour-force largely escaped industrial regulation, particularly that
undertaken by family members. Urban paid workers and capitalists
were price-setters. The reduction in aggregate demand from falling
export prices and capital inflows impacted differently in the two
sectors. Output was restricted to maintain price levels in the
oligopolistic sector, but in the competitive sector output increased
in an attempt to maintain income levels in the face offalling prices.
Output increased further when the unemployed took up farming.
The milk and wheat industries exemplified this.
Wheat prices fell from 6s6d per bushel in 1924-25 to 4s3.5d in
1929-30. The price slump impacted hardest on new and indebted
farmers in western NSW.t 7 Many struggling wheatfarmers believed
that the FSA's affiliation to the Country Party constrained its ability
to represent them. They formed new growers' organisations, such as
the Wheatgrowers' Union, that claimed to be non-political. These
farmers were unimpressed with the Country Party but they would
not necessarily support Labor, the party of high wages and tariffs}S
In July 1931 the Senate, controlled by the non-Labor parties, rejected
legislation proposed by the Scullin govemment to establish a national
wheat pool and a guaranteed minimum price for wheat. NSW Labor
believed that wheatfarmers would punish the state coalition for the
actions of the Senate.t 9
The dairy industry displayed a similar pattern of overproduction
and price deflation. Prior to legislation in 1929 prices to country
dairyman were settled by negotiations between the country milk
suppliers' association and the distributing companies. 20 Regulation
for health purposes of the dairy industry dated from 1886. 21 In 1927
the Lang government introduced legislation for a Metropolitan Milk
Board on pluralist corporatist lines with four members elected by
producers and three appointed by the government. Lang was defeated
before the legislation was passed and the Bavin government legislated
in 1929 for a Board of nine members. Producers elected four
members, the five others were government appointees: a chairman,
two representatives of consumers and two non-voting advisory
representatives of the distributing companies. The Board was to
regulate the supply and distribution and milk and set retail prices
and minimum prices to producers, but unlike Labor's proposed Board
it could not directly engage in the distribution ofmilk. 22 The Board
was unable to regulate the industry. Distributing companies evaded
price control by claiming to be agents of farmers rather than the
owners of the milk they sold. Dairy farmers relied largely on domestic
labour, and were easily able to increase productionY Discount
vendors purchased milk from dairies near Sydney and sold at all
hours undercutting award conditions. 24 Prices to farmers halved from
November 1930 to May 1931. 25 The rivalry among dairy farmers
played into the hands of statist corporatists. In the 1930 election
campaign Labor accused the Board of failing to confront the
distributing companies. 26
This attack on middlemen was repeated throughout Labor's rural
campaign and was combined with underconsumptionist economics.
'Organised marketing' would protect the farmer as arbitration did
the wage earner, and farmers would benefit from Labor's
defense of consumers' living standards. 27
After the election some in the Country Party believed

wheatfarmers had swung to Labor but others believed town residents
and public employees were responsible for Labor's gains. 28 A
statistical analysis supports the later position. The significant
contributors to country Labor support were unemployment and
Catholicity, rather than wheat farming. Labor's rural support was
more socially defined than in the urban-mining region where
Protestants and non-manual workers swung to Labor (see Table 1).
The 1930 election gave Labor a large majority and compliant
caucus. Lang chose as Agriculture minister William Dunn. In 192627 Dunn opposed Lang's leadership of the party. He now accepted
Lang's leadership but in policy he defended a pluralist corporatist
position that supported producer self-government and co-operation
with the FSA. The Health Department regulated the milk industry.
Health Ministers James McGirr and William Ely challenged Dunn's
pluralist corporatism. Both were Lang loyalists from urban
constituencies, but both had personal connections to the agricultural
sector. McGirr was a former country pharmacist, and Ely blamed
middlemen for driving him off his farm,29

2. The reform of marketing
Dunn's priority in government was to work with the FSA, but its
leadership was more sympathetic than the membership. The FSA
supported legislation to require only a simple majority among
producers for the formation of a marketing board. 30 Dunn promised
the FSA that there would be no alteration in the composition of
marketing boards. 31 He defended existing boards against Labor
parliamentarians who accused them of ignoring new producers. 32
Dunn's moderate position was displayed at the May 1931 conference
of producers and consumers.
Producers' delegates to the conference were elected by farmers
rather than appointed by their organisations, but turnout at the
meetings was low and returned members of established farmers'
organisations. The FSA was well represented among delegates and
its leadership welcomed the conference. 33 In the conference program
Dunn explained that the development of co-operative marketing
would end 'inefficient marketing and distribution' and benefit both
farmers and consumers.34 Two hundred delegates attended; 160 from
primary industries, and 40 consumers' delegates. 35 Dunn was
unapologetic that producers were disproportionately represented. 36
Lang promised the government would follow the advice of the
conference. 37 Conference delegates formed subcommittees to discuss
their industry and most supported organised marketing. 38 Union
delegates who claimed capitalism was to blame for the rural crisis
were ignored. 39 Labor believed that the conference's success showed
farmers no longer feared the 'red bogy. '40
The constitutional requirement of interstate free trade made
doubtful the value of a wheat pool restricted to one state. Despite
this the FSA supported an affirmative vote for a wheat pool under
the amended marketing legislation in July 1931.41 Pool opponents
argued the Lang government would control it: 2 Of the 87.6% of
farmers who voted only 42.7% voted 'yes' compared to 62.8% in
September 1930. The affirmative vote was highest in the newer wheat
areas to the west, where climate and wheat yields were most variable.
The FSA leadership blamed the defeat on anti Lang feeling.43 This
was certainly the case but the result also demonstrated that politicians,
bureaucrats and farmer organisations, often underestimated the extent
to which farmers would distrust any organisation that sought to
constrain their right to sell their produce as they saw fit. 44

3. Direct price regulation
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Concurrent with its support of a wheat pool NSW Labor along
with other Australian governments supported measures to
assist wheat farmers. The initial strategy of Labor governments

Table 1
Predictors of Lang Labor Support in Rural NSW 1930

1930

1930

Intercept

Women voters

Catholic

Unemployment

Female Workforce

18.1
0.18

-1.78
-2.77

10,74
3.

0.52
2,19

1.55
2.15

Manual

Non-manual

Non-wheat

Wheat

Employers

0.93
1,06

1.091
1.07

0.77
O. 88

1.03
1.09

-1.89
-3
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Intercept

Women voters

Catholic

Unemployment

Female workforce

149.91
0.01

-2,36
-3,01l

0.31.
1.21

0.271
1.19

0.28
0,7

Manual

Salariat

Agriculture

Employers

0.44
1,02

0.D3
0.051

-0.05
-0. II

-3.9
-2.9

had to been to either raise a loan to assist farmers, or to secure the
extension of Commonwealth bank credit. Both options would have
benefited farmers without directly impacting on consumers, Once
these options were rejected farmers could only benefit at the expense
of consumers or the manufacturers of consumer goods.
The Flour Acquisition Bill of March 1931 enabled the
government to compulsorily acquire stocks of flour and then sell
them back to the previous holder at a premium. The proceeds would
be applied to farmers' relief. The price of acquisition was set by a
committee representing government, flour millers and master
bakers. 45 The FSA and the Country Party welcomed higher prices
for urban consumers.<6 Lang claimed that city unionists had accepted
higher prices without a murmur.47 This was an overstatement. In
caucus Dunn prevailed against those members wanted consumer
representation on the committee setting flour prices, and for relief to
wheat farmers to be more rigorously targeted. 48
The legislation enabled maximum prices to be set for wheat
products such as bread. These prices had been regulated from 1915
to 1921. Dunn had been Agriculture minister in 1920-22 and in 1931
he argued that the price-setting process should be as 'harmonious'
as he believed it to have been in 1920-21. 49 Despite his hope the
issue was taken out of his hands. Labor backbenchers blamed millers
and bakers for higher bread prices, rather than farmers, and they
found support from cabinet ministers concerned about the impactof
higher bread prices on food relief expenditure. 50 In May 1931 bread
supplied under food relief amounted to one eighth of the total cost
ofrelief. 5!
The bread industry was highly monopolised. The Flour Millers
Association (FMA) refused to supply flour to bakers who sold below
the price set by the Master Bakers Association (MBA).52 The MBA
paid shops for dole coupons and was refunded by the government.
By the late 1920s innovations in baking technology made it easier
for small bakeries to set up, and many unemployed entered the
industry. 53 The MBA and the Operative Bakers Union claimed small
bakeries undercut award conditions, but their ability to produce cheap
bread was largely due to the use of family labour and low
capital costs. 54 By mid 1931 a bread price war was underway
and opponents of the MBA formed the Peoples' Bakers'

Association (PBA),55 The PBA supplied bread to shops to the alarm
of the Breadcarters' Union who feared job losses. 56
In response to the Flour Acquisition Act the MBA requested an
increase in the price of dole bread to 4.35d a loaf from the current
price of 3.5d. Labour and Industry minister Jack Baddeley, whose
Department was responsible for food relief in the metropolitan area,
rejected thisP Baddeley established a committee with consumer
representation to review bread prices. Its report agreed with the MBA
but cabinet rejected it. 58 One option for the government would have
been to implement party policy of establishing a state bakery, but
the government lacked the financial resources. 59
In April 1931 flour broker Marco Shadier approached the
government with a scheme by which he would take over from the
MBA as the discounter of dole coupons. Shadier told the government
that he could arrange the supply of cheap flour to bakers enabling
dole bread to be supplied at 3.92d a loaf. The government seized on
Shadier's offer as a means to defeat the MBA and took up his offer.
which came into effect from 1 August 1931.60 When implemented,
Shadier's plan was a debacle for the government. Millers boycotted
Shadier and as a result he was unable to supply bakers with flour,
Thousands of unemployed were left without bread. 6! The government
and Shadier blamed the flour millers and MBA, but the Bread Carters'
union sided with the Master Bakers and condemned the Shadier's
contract. 62 ALP branches rallied behind the government and
condemned the Bread Carters' for their support 0 f the MBA. 63 The
same week the government ran out of cash to pay public service
salaries. 64 After an acrimonious caucus meeting on 7 August the
government canceled its contract with ShadlerY An interim
settlement was arranged with the MBA to supply dole bread at 4s3d
per dozen loaves. 66
The fiasco revealed the limited capacity of the state to effectively
intervene in industry. The Colonial Secretary's Department failed to
adequately investigate Shadier's ability to supply flour. The
government used its powers under the Flour Acquisition Act to seize
a shipload of export flour. This action was popular with the party,
but the government had no idea what to do with it, and returned
it as part of its settlement with the MBA.61
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The settlement with the MBA provided for a review of bread
prices for food relief. Industrial Commission Albert Piddington
undertook the inquiry. He was strongly critical of the millers' cartel
and recommended 4s3d a dozen or 4.25d a loaf.68 The MBA rejected
his findings, and after further negotiations reached a settlement in
April 1932 for a dole price of 4s6d a dozen or 4.5d a loaf. 69
The Shadier's fiasco exemplified the dilemmas of statist
corporatism. To take over marketing the state required capital and
expertise. Shadier had failed to provide these and the government
had been forced to accept the terms of the MBA. In the dairy industry
Labor's approach was much more cautious and it sought to work
with the distributing companies. If taken too far this approach
threatened to make statist corporatist institutions merely the agent
of producer and trader interests, at the expense of consumers.
In January 1931 Health Minister McGirr pleased milk farmers
when he refused to allow a price reduction recommended by the
Milk Board. The Board demanded legislative reform to enable it to
control the distributing companies' evasion of the Act. 70 Labor instead
reconstructed the Board in a statist corporatist form. It introduced
legislation to establish a three member appointive board, called the
'Milk Board' rather than the 'Metropolitan Milk Board'. The new
board would comprise three government appointees; a chair and
representatives of producers and consumers. It would be able to vest
milk supplied for metropolitan consumption in itself, and to engage
in milk trading on its own behalf. Minister Ely justified the bill as a
health measure but Labor parliamentarians from dairying areas dwelt
on the plight of farmers ruined by excessive competition. 7! Some
farmers demanded an elective board but many believed the industry
was in such crisis that the bill should be accepted.72 The parliamentary
opposition opposed the Board's ability to trade on its own behalf,
but unions hoped this provision would mean nationalisation of the
industry.73 The Bill passed the Legislative Council only after the
appointment of25 new Labor Councillors in November.74
The process of conciliating dairy industry interests began the
appointment in December 1931 of Milk Board members. There was
general surprise when the chair was E. A Hamilton, who had been a
distributing company representative on the old Board. 7s The other
members were John Graham and J. M. Martin. Graham was a
Maitland dairy farmer who had represented producers on the old
Board. 76 Martin was a union organiser, Labor MLC, unsuccessful
Labor candidate in the January 1931 Parkes by-election and brother
of ALP organising secretary J. B. Martin. 77 Farmers welcomed the
appointment of Hamilton and Graham. They complained Martin
lacked milk industry experience. 78 The Milk Carters' were
disappointed that a unionist from the industry was not appointed,
but they regarded Martin as a labour representative,19
The new Board believed that without control of all milk supplied
for consumption in the metropolitan area, it would be unable to
enforce payment to dairymen of the minimum prices. 80 From 5 March
1932 when the Board made its first declaration of prices it took
possession of all milk supplied for consumption. The Board did not,
as Ely had originally suggested, enter business on its own but
employed existing companies as agents.8! Martin and Graham voted
against Hamilton to ensure that more than one company was endorsed
as agents of the Board. 82 Once delivered to an agent of the Milk
Board milk property of the Board. It remained in physical possession
of the distributing company, and when milk supplies reached Sydney
the companies paid the Board for milk. The Board, rather than the
companies, paid dairymen. 83
The Board adopted a pricing policy favourable to producers. All
members agreed on a maximum retail price of2s4d per gallon,
but Martin and Graham outvoted Hamilton to set a minimum
price to the dairyman of Isld per gallon rather than the IsOd

favoured by Hamilton. 84 Milk producers were delighted. 8s The AWU,
Federal Labor and manufacturers argued the increase was unfair to
consumers.86 Defenders of the Board pointed to the health danger of
cheap, but low quality milkY Martin's influence was apparent when
the Board introduced regulations to control the hours of milk delivery,
a po licy welcomed by the Milk Carters' Union. 88 This disadvantaged
consumers and small non-unionised vendors.89
Producers welcomed the activities of the Board after the milk
war.90 The Milk Board members were the only Labor appointees
made to a statutory authority in 1930-32 not dismissed by the Stevens
government. A 1936 inquiry concluded that the Board privileged
producer interests over consumers as shown by its failure to review
prices after March 1932 despite falling costs in the industry.9! Martin's
position was hostile to the distributing companies and sympathetic
to unionised milk carters but not particularly to consumers. A statist
corporatist model of regulation had pluralist corporatist outcomes
favouring organised producers at the expense of consumers.

Conclusion
At the 1932 election NSW Labor lost every electorate outside of the
urban and mining regions. Labor's record of agricultural policy
activism in 1930-32 demonstrates this failure was not for want of
trying. Despite Labor's appeal to milk farmers in 1930 and 1932 the
Labor vote in Maitland was below that statistically predicted in 1930
and 1932 by 7% and 10%. This contrasted with Murrumbidgee where
Labor overperformed in 1930 by 7% and 1932 by 3%. Murrumbidgee
was an electorate where Labor probably did exceptionally well among
farmers of whom many were soldier settlers who were dependent on
public irrigation. The decline of Labor's overperformance in
Murrumbidgee from 1930 to 1932 illustrates the general rural reaction
against Langism. The strong recovery in Labor's Murrumbidgee vote
in 1935 and 1938 demonstrates that the rural reaction against Lang
was restricted to 1931 and 1932.
In Australia the labour movement championed a worker-farmer
coalition based on the isolation of Australia from the world market.
This is the strategy that some suggest European social democrats
should have proposed in the 1930s to counter the appeal of fascism. 92
Australian Labor's failure suggests that even if European social
democrats had dropped their support for free trade in food they would
not have attracted farmers. Economic hardship among farmers does
not necessarily encourage a shift to the left on their part.93 In 193032 Labor's call for regulation of agriculture and control of the 'money
power' was met by an individualist call from some in the rural media
for farmers to adopt new methods of management and technology.94
Years later One Nation's pluralist corporatist appeal would face
similar opposition. In 1987 Geoffrey Lawrence argued that the
support by farmers' organisations for politics of economic liberalism
opened space for the radical right to appeal to farmers. When such a
force appeared in the form of One Nation, the National Party was
surprisingly successful in resisting it. 9s
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